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REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA
AND THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CLASSIFICATORY FIRST AMENDMENT
Genevieve Lakier*
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech
is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades now, the Supreme
Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas
or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained
only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny. 1 In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that
regulate speech for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser, and
often quite deferential, standard.2 Whether a law is found to be content-based or contentneutral therefore determines, in many cases, whether a First Amendment challenge to it
succeeds.
Despite the importance of the distinction, the Court has had trouble settling on a
single test of content-based lawmaking. Instead, it has vacillated between two different
tests. In one line of cases, the Court has insisted that laws are content-based whenever
they treat speakers differently because of the content of their speech—that is to say,
whenever they employ explicit content distinctions. In another line of cases, the Court
has instead insisted that laws are content-based only when they cannot be justified by a
content-neutral purpose—that is to say, when the government cannot adequately
demonstrate that the distinction the laws draws furthers some purpose other than to
restrict speech because the government dislikes its content, or fears its communicative
effects.
These two tests of content-based lawmaking are not merely different; in many
cases, they lead to different results. Hence lower courts tasked with determining whether
a given law is content-neutral or content-based have had to choose between two
competing but incompatible lines of precedent. The result has been the creation of what
commentators have described as a confused,3 inconsistent, 4 and highly malleable body of
law.5
*
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1
See, for example, United States v Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc, 529 US 803, 817 (2000);
R.A.V. v City of St Paul, Minn, 505 US 377, 382 (1992).
2
The standard articulation of this test can be found in Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781,
791 (1989) (requiring content-neutral speech regulations to be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and [to] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information”).
3
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint
Determinations, 34 McGeorge L Rev 595, 602 (2003) (“[T]he Court has experienced increasing difficulty
in making [content determinations], and in making them consistently.”).
4
Barry McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting Freedom
of Expression, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1347, 1353 (2006).
5
Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable
Doctrine, 13 Comm L & Pol 131, 132–34 (2008).
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Two terms ago, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,6 the Court attempted to bring some
clarity to this messy area of First Amendment jurisprudence when it held that laws that
employ content distinctions are always content-based, regardless of the purposes they
serve.7 The Court acknowledged that in earlier cases it had looked at the government’s
purposes when deciding whether a given law was or was not content-based. It insisted,
however, that those cases dealt only with regulations that did not treat speakers
differently because of what they said—that did not make what it described as “obvious”
or “subtle” content distinctions.8 The Court thus construed the test of content neutrality as
a two-step inquiry in which courts first determine whether a law makes facial content
distinctions, and second, if—but only if—it doesn’t, do they look at the purposes that
justify the law.9
By insisting that both the face of the law and the government’s purposes have a
role to play in the content-neutrality inquiry, the Reed Court managed to reconcile what
up until then had appeared to be irreconcilable precedents. What this required, however,
was the implicit overruling of the multiple decisions in which the Court did what the
Reed majority said it had never done: namely, it held that a law that made facial contentdistinctions was content neutral because it could be justified by reference to a contentneutral purpose.10 And what it means, going forward, is that the government will have a
much harder time defending facially content-based laws against constitutional challenges
than it did in the past, when, notwithstanding the conflicting instructions they received
from the Supreme Court, lower courts frequently held that laws that made facial content
distinctions were content-neutral.
Reed thus represents an important change in First Amendment doctrine, and one
that will in all likelihood have a significant impact in many areas of law. Indeed, we are
already seeing evidence of Reed’s effects across the country, as courts apply strict
scrutiny—and strike down—laws that previously were, or likely would have been, upheld
as content neutral prior to Reed.11 This may only be the tip of the iceberg. By insisting
that strict scrutiny applies to all laws that treat speakers differently because of the content
of their speech, Reed potentially imperils the hundreds, even perhaps thousands, of local,
state, and federal laws that make subject matter or viewpoint distinctions. 12 The decision

6

135 S Ct 2218 (2015).
Id at 2227.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See note 88, and accompanying text.
11
See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v Attorney Gen. United States, 825 F3d 149 (3rd Cir 2016); Sarver
v. Chartier, 813 F3d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir 2016); Cent Radio Co v City of Norfolk, 811 F3d 625, 631 (4th
Cir 2016); Norton v City of Springfield, Ill, 806 F3d 411 (7th Cir 2015).
12
Laws that make facial content distinctions include local, state, and federal sign laws; laws that
zone adult movie theatres and bookstores differently than other kinds of theatres and bookstores; laws that
impose special tax burdens on lobbying and other expressive activities; campaign finance laws that
distinguish between electioneering and non-electioneering communications; mail regulations that allow
certain kinds of publications lower rates on their mail; and even portions of the Digital Copyright
Millennium Act that prohibit the posting of certain kinds of information. See Universal City Studios, Inc v
Corley, 273 F3d 429, 447–55 (2d Cir 2001). This is by no means a complete list. For more discussion of
some of the laws that Reed may affect, see Part II.B.
7

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921864

thus demonstrates once again the pronounced deregulatory tilt of the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence.13
This Article examines the change that Reed makes to First Amendment doctrine,
and its normative justifications. It does so by means of an analogy to the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence, and specifically its case law dealing with race discrimination.
As the Article demonstrates, the shift that Reed enacts in First Amendment law
resembles in many respects the shift that occurred several decades ago in equal protection
law, when the Court squarely embraced what scholars have described as an anticlassificatory test of race discrimination and insisted that all laws that employ racial
distinctions are presumptively invalid, no matter the purposes the government invokes to
justify them.14 Reed insists, similarly, that all laws that employ content distinctions are
presumptively invalid, no matter the purposes the government invokes to justify them. It
announces what we might thus describe as an anti-classificatory test of content
discrimination. In so doing, it makes it—in theory at least—as difficult for the
government to defend facially content-based laws against constitutional challenge as it is
to defend racially classificatory laws.
The question that Reed raises is whether it should be as difficult to defend facially
content-based laws against constitutional challenge as it is to defend racially
classificatory ones. Some scholars have argued that the answer to this question is an
obvious and unqualified yes.15 This Article suggests that the answer is a good deal more
complicated than that. This is because of the value that content distinctions possess, as
regulatory tools.
In its equal protection cases, the Court has insisted that all laws that employ racial
distinctions should be treated as presumptively invalid because these distinctions are not,
in the vast majority of circumstances, relevant to the government’s legitimate regulatory
concerns. It is this fact, the Court has insisted, that allows courts to presume that when
the government employs racial distinctions as regulatory tools, either prejudice or animus
motivates its actions.
Content distinctions are not, however, usually irrelevant to the government’s
legitimate regulatory concerns. Instead, they play an important role in the regulation of
both the public and private spheres. What this means is that the mere fact that a law
employs content distinctions is not enough to create a presumption of bad intent. The
consequence is that the Reed Court’s embrace of an anti-classificatory test of contentbased lawmaking is likely to result in the invalidation of a good many laws that are not in
fact the product of a discriminatory purpose and that do not otherwise pose a significant
13

For other perspectives on the Roberts Court’s approach to the First Amendment, see Genevieve
Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 Harv L Rev 2166 (2016); Gregory P. Magarian, Marrow
of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 Wm & Mary L
Rev 1339 (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 Fed Comm L J 579
(2011).
14
Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U Miami L Rev 9, 10 (2003) (“Roughly speaking, [the anti-classification] principle
holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a
forbidden category: for example, their race”). For more discussion, see notes 114-121 and accompanying
text.
15
See, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for
Content Neutrality, 16 U Pa J Const L 1261, 1305 (2014); Chemerinsky, 63 Fed Comm L J at 59–61 (cited
in note 13).
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threat to First Amendment interests. The costs of the Reed rule are likely, in other words,
to be significant.
The fact that the test of content-based lawmaking announced in Reed is likely to
result in the invalidation of a good number of laws that pose no apparent threat to any
significant First Amendment interest suggest that it can be justified only if there is no
other, less costly, means of protecting speakers against discrimination. It is by no means
obvious, however, that there isn’t. Indeed, in her concurring opinion in Reed, Justice
Kagan suggested an alternative test of content-based lawmaking that may be superior to
Reed in a variety of ways.
By exploring the connections between equal protection and free speech law, this
Article attempts to shed new light on familiar First Amendment questions. It proceeds in
four parts. Part I examines the decades-long struggle on the Court between two
competing approaches to the identification of content-based laws, and the significant shift
Reed enacts in the doctrine. Part II explores Reed’s virtues as a test of content-based
lawmaking. Part III explores its significant drawbacks by means of an analogy to the
Equal Protection Clause. Part IV explores the alternative tests the Court could employ to
identify content-based regulations of speech and suggests why these would be superior to
the very broad anti-classificatory test that Reed announces.
I. IDENTIFYING CONTENT DISCRIMINATION
The First Amendment guarantees expressive freedom—specifically, “the freedom
of speech, and press.”16 For over seventy years, however, the Court has held that the First
Amendment prohibits not only state actions that make it very difficult for individuals to
express themselves but also regulations—even not very repressive ones—that “unfairly
discriminate” among speakers based on the content of their speech.17 It has interpreted
the First Amendment, in other words, to guarantee not only expressive liberty but also
expressive equality, of a sort.
The Court has read an anti-discrimination principle into the First Amendment
because it has recognized that what freedom of speech requires is not only that
individuals can speak but that they can do so in a public arena that is free from
governmental manipulation and control. 18 It has accordingly interpreted the First
Amendment to guarantee not only an individual right to speak but also the existence of a
particular kind of social institution—what is commonly referred to today as the
“marketplace of ideas.”19
16

US Const Amend I.
The quote comes from Cox v New Hampshire, which is the first case I know of that explicitly
recognizes the First Amendment antidiscrimination principle. 312 US 569, 576 (1941) (recognizing that
municipalities have the “authority to control the use of [their] public streets for parades or processions” and
to impose “time, place and manner” restrictions on those who wish to participate in parades, so long as they
do so “without unfair discrimination”).
18
See, for example, Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 24–25 (1971) (arguing that the “constitutional
right of free expression . . . is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion”); Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”).
19
See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1
(1984).
17
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Laws that discriminate among speakers based on the content of their speech, the
Court has argued, threaten the vitality and independence of this marketplace of ideas.
They do so by giving a competitive advantage to ideas and messages the government
likes.20 They also, the Court has argued, undermine the “equality of status” of those who
participate in public debate.21 For these reasons, the Court has insisted that “regulations
that permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of its message
cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.”22
Ensuring that regulations that permit the government to engage in content
discrimination aren’t tolerated has proven to be no easy matter, however. This is in part a
consequence of what the Court has interpreted the prohibition against discrimination to
mean.
Even though the primary argument that the Court has relied upon to explain why
discriminatory laws violate the First Amendment is a consequentialist one—namely, that
laws of this sort pose a threat to the “robust [and] wide-open” debate the First
Amendment is intended to guarantee23—the Court has unequivocally rejected the idea
that laws might be considered discriminatory merely on the basis of their effects on the
speech marketplace. 24 Instead, the Court has tended to equate discrimination with
discriminatory purpose. The Court has not done so explicitly.25 Nevertheless, it has,
almost without exception, insisted that the evil the prohibition against content
discrimination guards against are efforts by the government to “proscrib[e] speech, or . . .
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,” or to otherwise
advance what Justice Scalia once described as “thought-control purposes.”26
The Court has nevertheless expressed considerable skepticism about the ability of
courts to accurately identify, in individual cases, when the government acts with bad
20

R.A.V., 505 US at 387 (content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”); City of Ladue v Gilleo, 512 US 43, 60
(1994) (O’Connor concurring) (noting that “the free speech principle” makes it “improper [for the
government to] attempt[] to value some forms of speech over others, or . . . to distort public debate”).
21
Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 96 (1972).
22
Regan v Time, Inc, 468 US 641, 648–49 (1984).
23
NY Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
24
Ward, 491 US at 791 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression
is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”).
25
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U Chi L Rev 413, 428 (1996) (noting that the Court “has hesitated to discuss the
[role that] illicit motive [plays in First Amendment law] in any detail or with any directness”).
26
R.A.V., 505 US at 382; Madsen v Women’s Health Center, Inc, 512 US 753, 794–95 (1994). See
also Gilleo, 512 US at 51 (arguing that regulations that treat some speakers differently from others threaten
First Amendment interests because of the risk that they “may represent a governmental attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people . . . [or] to control . . .
the search for political truth”) (quotation marks omitted); id at 60 (O’Connor concurring) (noting that “the
free speech principle” makes it “improper [for the government to] attempt[] to value some forms of speech
over others, or . . . to distort public debate”); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc v Ragland, 481 US 221, 228–
29 (1987) (arguing that discriminatory taxes are prohibited by the First Amendment because they give the
government “a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected”). See also Kagan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 414
(cited in note 25) (arguing that “First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past
several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U Pa L Rev 615, 617
(1991) (“The Court . . . has interpreted content discrimination quite narrowly as involving a particular type
of government purpose served by the regulation of speech.”).
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purposes of this sort. It has insisted that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter” and one that judges are ill-suited to perform.27
As a result, the Court has generally refused to engage in a direct analysis of
discriminatory intent. Instead, it has attempted to identify discrimination indirectly, by
analyzing the “fit” between the ends the government claims a particular law advances and
the means chosen to advance those ends. It has insisted that laws that reveal a very poor
fit between statutory means and ends should be struck down—even in cases where the
poor fit results from the narrowness of the statutory prohibition, not its breadth. 28
Underinclusive speech regulations are considered as suspect as overinclusive speech
regulations, the Court has explained, because, in both cases, what the poorness of the fit
between the statute’s means and ends produces is doubt about the credibility of the
government’s purported motivations.29
This indirect approach to the analysis of discrimination provides an elegant
solution to the problems created by the fact-finding limitations of judges. It also has the
benefit of making it difficult for the government to restrict speech even when its actions
are not in fact motivated by dislike of the targeted speech but are instead merely the
product of carelessness or laziness, or political expediency on the legislature’s part.30
This is because in all cases, what the government must demonstrate in order to justify the
restriction of constitutionally protected speech is the existence of a substantial or, at least,
a legitimate state interest—and the Court has made clear that administrative convenience
does not qualify as an interest of this sort.31
The approach has a significant drawback, however. Because it operates
prophylactically, it may be used to invalidate laws that are not in fact a product of
discriminatory purpose, nor the consequence of legislative laziness or political selfinterest. Depending on how tight a fit between means and ends is required, it may in fact
make it extremely difficult for the government to ever justify regulating speech. This is a
problem because, as the Court has long recognized, speech regulations can further
important constitutional, as well as extra-constitutional, goals, by creating the conditions
under which individuals can effectively utilize their free speech rights, and by protecting
the “safety and convenience” of the people.32 Even if the ability of the government to
27

United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 383–84 (1968).
Cases in which the Court struck down laws that failed to apply broadly enough include Florida
Star v B.J.F., 491 US 524 (1989); Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 465 (1980); Mosley, 408 US at 96.
29
Gilleo, 512 US at 51–52 (“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of
speech . . . may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first
place. . . . [A]n exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a
governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views
to the people.”).
30
Id at 51.
31
Mosley, 408 US at 102 n 9; Schneider v New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 US 147, 151 (1939)
(“Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”).
32
As the Court put it in Cox: “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent
with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they
28
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regulate is not entirely foreclosed, a very high fit requirement grants judges a great deal
of power to second-guess legislative choices, and thus threatens what the Court has
recognized in the post-Lochner era to be an important value: namely, the regulatory
autonomy of the democratically elected legislature.33
The Court has been unwilling as a result to construe the First Amendment to
require a very close fit between means and ends in all cases in which the government
restricts protected expression. Instead, in most cases involving the regulation of speech, it
requires only that the fit between statutory means and statutory ends be a reasonable one.
Hence, when the government regulates speech in limited or nonpublic forums—that is, in
spaces and institutions that have not traditionally served as important sites for the public
expression of ideas—the Court requires only that the restrictions the government imposes
on expression are “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”34 What this
means is that the government may not restrict speech because it dislikes its viewpoint or
its ideas, but it may reserve the forum “for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion
of certain subjects.”35 Similarly, when the government restricts speech by government
employees, the Court has made clear that it need only show that the restriction serves a
legitimate workplace goal and that the government’s interest in regulating the speech
outweighs the employee’s interest in speaking.36 The Court applies even more lenient
review to the regulation of the private workplace.37
The Court applies more stringent scrutiny when the government regulates speech
that takes place in the public forum—that is, on government property that has
traditionally or by design been used for the public expression of ideas.38 It also applies
more stringent scrutiny when the government regulates speech on private property that

ultimately depend.” 312 US at 574. The suggestion here is that governmental regulation of the public
sphere may not only be constitutional; it may be constitutionally required.
33
See, for example, United States v Albertini, 472 US 675, 689 (1985) (arguing that the
constitutionality of speech regulations “does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests”);
Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288, 299 (1984) (rejecting lower court decision
striking down park service regulation preventing protestors from sleeping in two national parks because
“[w]e do not believe . . . that [the First Amendment] assign[s] to the judiciary the authority to replace the
Park Service as the manager of the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge
how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained”).
34
Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc, 473 US 788, 806 (1985).
35
Id at 802 (citing Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37,
45, 46 n 7 (1983)).
36
Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v Board of Education of
Township High School District 205, Will County, Ill, 391 US 563, 568 (1968)) (noting that, when a public
employee speaks on matters of public concern, “[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public”).
37
See, for example, Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited
Expression, 43 Md L Rev 4 (1984); James Q. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 Hastings Const L Q 189 (1984); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U Ill L Rev 939, 949 (2007);
Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 Seton
Hall L Rev 42 (1987).
38
Perry Education Association, 460 US at 45.
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addresses itself to the public sphere.39 This is because it recognizes that the government
has fewer legitimate reasons to regulate the public sphere than to regulate the private.40
Hence, the risk that when it does regulate, it does so to achieve impermissible ends, is
greater.
Even in such cases, however, the Court imposes only a relatively modest burden
of justification when the government regulates speech in a content-neutral manner. In
such cases, the Court requires only that the regulation “promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,” that it
does so by means that are neither significantly overbroad nor significantly underbroad,
and that it leave open adequate alternative channels for those impacted by it to
communicate.41
The Court imposes a much heavier burden of justification when the government
engages in the content-based regulation of speech—at least high-value speech. For
decades now, the Court has insisted that regulations that restrict high-value speech
because of its content are “presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment.42 As a
result, they can be upheld only if the government can satisfy strict scrutiny by
demonstrating that the regulation advances a compelling interest by the least restrictive
means available.43 This is a demanding standard; and one the government usually has
trouble satisfying.44
The Court has explained that strict scrutiny is necessary because of the significant
risk that content-based speech regulations either are the product of, or can be used to
further, discriminatory purposes. As Justice Powell noted in Consolidated Edison Co of
New York v Public Service Commission of New York45 in 1980: “[W]hen regulation is
based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully
[than in other cases] to ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’”46 The implication, of course, is
that regulations that are not “based on the content of the speech” are subject to less

39

See, for example, Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981); Erznoznik v City of
Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 211–12 (1975).
40
Compare Garcetti, 547 US at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little
chance for the efficient provision of public services.”) and Adderley v Fla, 385 US 39, 47 (1966) (“The
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the
use to which it is lawfully dedicated.’’) with Mosley, 408 US at 96 (“[G]overnment may not grant the use
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored
or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public
facilities. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not
prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.”).
41
Ward, 491 US at 797–800.
42
Playboy, 529 US at 817 (citing R.A.V., 505 US at 382).
43
Playboy, 529 US at 813.
44
Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1293 (cited in note 15). In a recent survey of content neutrality
cases in the lower federal courts, Kreimer found that, at least in cases involving the regulation of public
forums, content-based restrictions were struck down 97 percent of the district court cases and 87 percent of
court of appeals case. Id. In contrast, he found that laws deemed content-neutral were struck down only 28
percent of the time in the district court cases and 56 percent of the time in the court of appeals. Id.
45
447 US 530 (1980).
46
Id at 536.
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careful scrutiny because they pose less of a risk that they were enacted “merely because
public officials disapprove of the speakers’ views.”
By requiring a higher burden of justification in cases in which it is more likely
that invidious purposes are at work and a lesser burden of justification in cases in which
this is less likely the case, the Court has attempted to effectively enforce the prohibition
against discriminatory speech regulations without unduly limiting the government’s
regulatory power. This is an obviously worthy goal. Nevertheless, it is one that has
proven, in practice, extremely hard to implement, given serious and pervasive
disagreement on the Court about how broadly the prophylactic instrument of strict
scrutiny should apply.
A.

The Fight Over the Meaning of Content-Based Lawmaking

For decades now, scholars have complained about the “[p]rofound problems [that]
plague the . . . use of the judicially created categories of content-neutral and contentbased speech regulations and orders.”47 They have argued that the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral laws that the cases draw is “inconsistent” and prone to
manipulation.48 They have blamed this on the results-oriented nature of the Court’s
jurisprudence and its theoretical incoherency. 49 In fact, much of the doctrinal
inconsistency that scholars have identified can be blamed on the significant, and
persistent, disagreement among members of the Court about how broadly the
presumption against content-based lawmaking should apply.
Some on the Court have argued that the presumption should apply broadly: that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for all speech regulations that make
regulatory distinctions that turn on the content of speech. This is because, they have
argued, laws of this kind are more likely than other kinds of laws to be used for “thoughtcontrol purposes” given the power they give the government to target ideas or messages
or topics it dislikes. Justice Scalia made this argument, for example, in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Madsen v Women’s Health Center: “The danger of content-based
statutory restrictions upon speech,” Scalia wrote, “is that they may be designed and used
precisely to suppress the ideas in question rather than to achieve any other proper
governmental aim.”50 The fact that laws of this sort “lend [themselves] . . . readily to the
targeted suppression of particular ideas . . . render[] [them] deserving of the high standard
of strict scrutiny.”51
Other members of the Court have argued for a narrower application of strict
scrutiny. Justice Stevens, for example, argued that because there are many legitimate
47

Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly
Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L Rev 69, 71 (1997).
48
McDonald, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 4). See also Robert Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan L Rev 1249, 1265 (1995) (“Whatever the ultimate merits of a First
Amendment focus on content neutrality, the Court’s doctrinal elaboration of [it] has been haphazard,
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reasons why the government might want to distinguish between speakers based on the
content of their speech, a rule that subjected all facially content-based laws to strict
scrutiny would intrude too much on the government’s legitimate regulatory powers.52 He
argued that strict scrutiny should therefore apply only when there was some reason to
suspect that the government’s motivations for acting were improper. This was always the
case, Justice Stevens argued, when the purposes the government invoked to justify the
law were constitutionally prohibited—such as, for example, when the government
enacted a law in order “to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial
issues of general interest.”53 In other cases, however, Stevens argued that strict scrutiny
was only appropriate when there was some evidence that the “regulation [was] biased in
favor of one point of view or another, or [provided the government] . . . a subtle method
of regulating the controversial subjects that may be placed on the agenda for public
debate[.]”54 But the mere fact that a law made content-based distinctions did not, he
insisted, mean that it should be treated as a presumptively invalid “content-based”
regulation of speech.55
In different cases, these different points of view managed to persuade a shifting
majority of the Court. The result was the creation of two distinct and inconsistent tests of
content-based lawmaking.
In one line of cases, the Court employed the strict test of content-based
lawmaking that Justice Scalia advocated. That is to say, it treated laws that made facial
content distinctions as necessarily content-based. In Burson v Freeman,56 for example,
the Court concluded that a Tennessee law that prohibited election-related speech near
polling places was content-based because “[w]hether individuals may exercise their free
speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a
political campaign.”57 In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc v Ragland, the Court similarly
held that a state tax law that taxed magazines but exempted “religious, professional, trade
and sports journals” from the tax was content-based because the law required state
officials to “examine the content of the message . . . conveyed” by the magazine to
determine whether it was subject to the tax.58 And in Simon & Schuster, Inc v Members of
New York State Crime Victims Board,59 the Court concluded that a New York law that
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See, for example, R.A.V., 505 US at 420 (Stevens concurring) (arguing that “[a]lthough the
Court has, on occasion, declared that content-based regulations of speech are ‘never permitted’ . . . our
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coherent understanding of the First Amendment”); Consolidated Edison Co, 447 US at 545–46 (Stevens
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prohibited convicted felons from making a profit off stories of their crimes was contentbased because it was “directed only at works with a specified content.”60
In another line of cases, the Court employed instead the more purpose-oriented
test of content-based lawmaking that Justice Stevens championed. In this line of cases,
the Court insisted that speech regulations were content-based when, but only when, they
could not be “justified without reference to the content of the speech they regulated.”61
Although, as we shall see later, what precisely this meant varied over time, in its most
rigorous form, the Court interpreted this test to require it to first look at the purposes the
government claimed the regulation furthered. If these purposes evinced a concern with
the communicative effects of the speech—that is to say, if they evinced a concern with
the effect of the expression of its ideas or messages on an audience—the Court concluded
that the risk that the government was acting because it disliked the speech, or for some
other impermissible reason, was sufficiently great to warrant strict scrutiny and
accordingly deemed the law content-based.62 If not, the Court examined whether there
was evidence that the purposes the government invoked to justify the law were actually
furthered by the distinctions it drew.63 If there was, the Court treated the law as contentneutral; if not, it treated the law as content-based.64
Although these two lines of cases could easily be reconciled when it came to
facially content-neutral laws—in such cases, the Court rather unproblematically applied
the “justified without reference to the content of speech” test65—they could not be easily
reconciled when it came to facially content-based laws. Consider, for example, City of
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Playboy, 529 US at 811 (holding that a law requiring cable providers to scramble channels dedicated to
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Discovery Network, 507 US at 42 (requiring the city to establish some empirical “basis” for the
distinctions it drew).
64
Id at 428 (concluding that “the absence of some basis for distinguishing between ‘newspapers’
and ‘commercial handbills’ that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city” meant that a law that
distinguished between the two kinds of speech was not “justified without reference to the content. . .”). See
also Erznoznik, 422 US at 214–15 (concluding that a regulation that prohibited the showing of nudity in
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See, for example, Bartnicki, 532 US at 526; Ward, 491 US at 791; Clark, 468 US at 293.
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Renton v Playtime Theatres, Inc, 66 a case in which the Court held that a zoning ordinance
that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residences,
churches, parks, or schools was content-neutral even though the law identified adult
movie theatres by reference to the content of the movies they exhibited.67 The Court
acknowledged that the law made distinctions based on the content of speech but
nevertheless concluded that strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review
because the law “aimed not at the content of the films shown [by adult movie theaters]
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.”68
Because the purpose of the ordinance, the Court found, was to “prevent the crime, protect
the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally protect and preserve the
quality of the city's neighborhoods, . . . not to suppress the expression of unpopular
views,” and because the Court found that the city council had a reasonable basis for its
beliefs that the speech it restricted differed in a relevant way from the speech it left
unrestricted, the majority concluded that the ordinance was “completely consistent with
our definition of content-neutral speech regulations as those that are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”69
Justice Brennan wrote an impassioned dissent in which he argued that, because
the ordinance “selectively imposes limitations on the location of a movie theater based
exclusively on the content of the films shown there,” it could not be treated as a contentneutral regulation of speech. 70 And indeed, the holding in Renton is impossible to
reconcile with the various precedents in which the Court had insisted that laws were
content-based whenever their application depended upon “the nature of the message . . .
conveyed” by the speech they regulated.71
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, the Court continued to construe as contentneutral laws that made content distinctions on their face but that it found to be adequately
justified by a content-neutral purpose.72 In other cases, however, it continued to insist that
laws were content-based if their application “depend[ed] on what [individuals] say.”73
The persistence of these two distinct and inconsistent tests of content-based
lawmaking in the Court’s First Amendment cases created a very confusing, and
contentious body of law. As Seth Kreimer noted in 2014, members of the Supreme Court
66

475 US 41.
Id at 47.
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Id (emphasis in original).
69
Id at 48 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). See also id at 50-52 (noting detailed
evidence of the harm of adult movie theatres that the City Council relied upon when it enacted the law).
70
Id at 55 (Brennan dissenting).
71
Regan, 468 US at 648; see also Carey, 447 US at 462 (concluding that a law was content-based
because “it is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt
prohibition”).
72
See, for example, Alameda Books, 535 US at 431–32 (concluding that a law that prohibited the
establishment of more than one adult bookstore or video arcade in the same building could be considered
content-neutral); Hill, 530 US at 703–04 (concluding that law that prohibited “oral protest, education, or
counseling” near the entrance to abortion clinics was content-neutral because it was not “adopted because
of disagreement with the message [the speech it regulated conveys]”); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US at
793 n 1 (construing as content-neutral a law that prohibited the posting of any handbill or signs on public
property, but exempted from the ban “metal plaque[s] or plate[s] . . . commemorating an historical, cultural,
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“regularly [fell] into acrimonious disputes” about whether laws were content-based or
content neutral—frequently because of disagreement about which test to apply—and a
“similar perplexity . . . afflicted the lower courts.” 74 Indeed, on multiple occasions,
different courts—and sometimes different members of the same court—applied different
tests of content-based lawmaking to reach opposite conclusions about the content
neutrality, or lack thereof, of the same or very similar laws.75 Even the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content
neutral [was] not always a simple task.”76
B.

Reed and the Turn Away from Purposes

The decision two terms ago in Reed can be understood as an attempt, by at least
some members of the Court, to finally resolve the endemic confusion that has plagued the
content discrimination cases by asserting explicitly what no prior opinion had: namely,
that all laws that employ content classifications trigger strict scrutiny, no matter what
purposes the government invokes to justify them and no matter how innocuous they may
seem.
The case involved a municipal sign ordinance promulgated by the small town of
Gilbert, Arizona.77 The ordinance imposed a general permit requirement on those who
wished to erect signs within the city limits but it exempted twenty-three types of signs
from the requirement, including “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying
Event,” “Political Signs,” and “Ideological Signs.”78 To qualify for the exemption, a sign
not only had to fall into one of the exempt categories; it also had to comply with the
detailed restrictions the ordinance imposed on the display of each type of exempted sign.
These restrictions varied in severity. To qualify as a Temporary Directional Sign Relating
to a Qualifying Event, for example, a sign had to direct viewers to an event organized by
a religious, charitable, or other non-profit group, be no more than six square feet in size,
and to be put up no more than twelve hours before and be taken down no more than one
hour after the event it gave directions to ended.79 In contrast, Political Signs (defined as
“temporary sign[s] designed to influence the outcome of an election called by a public
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body”) could be up to thirty-two square feet and could be displayed up to sixty days
before a primary election, and up to fifteen days following a general election.80
The law treated speakers differently, in other words, based on the content of their
speech. Nevertheless, both the district court and Ninth Circuit concluded that the law was
a content-neutral regulation of speech because it could be justified without reference to
the speech it regulated.81
Justice Thomas, writing for six members of the Court, rejected the lower courts’
conclusion that the sign ordinance was content-neutral, as well the test of content
discrimination they employed to reach this result. “Government regulation of speech is
content based,” he wrote, “if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”82 Therefore, because the Gilbert law applied
different rules to signs depending on the topic or idea or message they expressed, the
Court “ha[d] no need to consider the government's justifications or purposes . . . to
determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”83
Thomas acknowledged that in earlier cases the Court had looked at the
government’s purposes to determine whether laws were content-based but insisted that
these cases dealt with an entirely “separate and additional category of laws”—namely,
laws that did not make subject matter or viewpoint-based distinctions on their face (that
were, as he put it, “facially content neutral”).84 But laws that “appl[y] to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” Thomas insisted, are
“subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”85
Therefore the “crucial first step” courts have to employ when confronted with a First
Amendment challenge to a law is to look at the face of the law and determine whether it
makes either “subtle” or “obvious” content distinctions.86 Only if the statute does not
make these kinds of facial content distinctions, Thomas explained, should the court
proceed to the second step of the analysis and look at the purposes the government
invoked to justify the law.87
By insisting that the “justified without reference” test applied only to facially
content-neutral laws, the opinion finally provided lower courts what they had been
missing: namely, clear instructions on what to do when faced with facially content-based
laws. What this required, however, was the implicit overruling of the multiple decisions
in which the Court had done precisely what the Reed majority asserted it never had:
namely, construed facially content-based laws as content neutral because of the purposes
that justified them.88 What Reed means, going forward, is that it will be much more
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difficult than previously for the government to defend facially content-based regulations
of speech against constitutional challenge.
The decision thus raises anew the question that has been simmering for more than
three decades: namely, does Reed’s approach better advance First Amendment interests
than the alternative, “justified without reference” standard? Answering this question turns
out to be quite difficult. In the next Part, I examine the advantages of the Reed approach
and I then turn in Part III to an examination of its costs.
II. REED’S VIRTUES
The case for the Reed test is an easy one to make. It is absolutely true, as Justice
Scalia argued on multiple occasions, that laws that treat speakers differently because of
the ideas or messages or subject matter of their speech “lend themselves” to invidious
uses.89 This is because content distinctions give the government the power to target only
those specific ideas or messages or topics it dislikes. They thus lower the costs of
repression, by making it possible for the government to repress only the speech of its
enemies and not the speech of its friends.90 They provide in other words an attractive
vehicle for advancing constitutionally prohibited purposes.
Certainly there are plenty of examples of facially content-based laws that have
been used to repress speech because the government disliked it or feared its effect on an
audience.91 The history of speech regulation in the United States thus provides vivid
testament to the dangers inherent in facially content-based lawmaking. And the
willingness of courts to uphold, in various circumstances, laws that targeted the speech of
communists, radicals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other groups on what seem to us today to
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be reed-thin pretexts provide a good example of how easily judges can be persuaded to
acquiesce in the repressive impulses of legislatures.92
The bright-line test of content-based lawmaking that Reed announced appears, at
least at first glance, to provide a more effective means of constraining the repressive and
censorial impulses of both legislators and judges than the alternative, more complicated
justification test the Reed majority rejected, at least as applied to facially content-based
laws. This is because, by making the statutory text the primary determinant of the level of
scrutiny, it limits the ability of courts to afford stricter scrutiny to laws they dislike and
lesser scrutiny to laws they like. It vests courts with less discretion than does a test that
requires courts to evaluate whether the government’s purposes are adequately justified
before determining the standard of scrutiny that applies. As a result, it makes it harder for
courts to apply a lower standard of scrutiny in cases in which they are sympathetic to the
government.
Of course, no test is entirely foolproof. Judicial power carries with it inherent
discretion, and the tiered system of scrutiny provides particular room for maneuver. As
the Court’s own cases reveal, what it means for a law to be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling interest, or to serve a significant interest by reasonably tailored means, can
vary considerably from case to case. 93 Furthermore, in Reed’s wake, courts retain
considerable discretion to determine how broadly the decision applies, although this
discretion may ultimately be limited by the articulation of clear rules.94
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to understand why a majority of the Court believed
that a bright-line test of content-based lawmaking would provide better protection against
judges’ and legislator’s worst impulses than the alternative. This is particularly the case
given plenty of evidence that, prior to Reed, lower courts frequently applied the “justified
without reference” test in a manner that was excessively deferential to government
interests. Rather than requiring the government to provide evidence that the content
distinctions it drew actually furthered the purposes it invoked to justify the law, courts
frequently took the government’s claims of statutory purpose at face value.
The lower court opinion in Reed provides a good example of how little evidence
courts sometimes required to conclude that a law that made facial content distinctions
was adequately justified by a content-neutral purpose. In her concurring opinion in Reed,
Justice Kagan argued that the arguments the town of Gilbert provided to explain why
directional signs were treated differently from political signs and ideological signs were
92
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so weak they couldn’t pass the “laugh test,” let alone strict or intermediate scrutiny.95 The
town failed entirely, for example, to explain why only four such signs could be placed on
any given private property.96 The only argument the town could come up to explain why
temporary directional signs had to be so much smaller than other signs was that they had
“to direct travelers along a route.”97 But of course one would think precisely the opposite
would be the case. Meanwhile the only argument the town provided to explain why
directional signs had to be taken down within one hour after the event they advertised had
concluded, but election-related signs could stay up for ten days after the election they
advertised had concluded, and ideological signs never had to be taken down at all, was
that “Ideological Signs and Political Signs . . . retain expressive value” even when they
advertise a completed event and moreover “do not have the same potential to confuse
travelers because [they do not provide] guidance to a specific location for a time-sensitive
event.”98 It is far from clear, however, why a sign advertising a now-concluded religious
meeting should prove any less expressively meaningful or more confusing than a sign
advertising a now-concluded election. Nor did the town provide any evidence to back up
its claim that directional signs had more potential to confuse travelers than other kinds of
signs.99
Notwithstanding the problems with the arguments the town made to justify the
law, both the district court and two panels of the Ninth Circuit held that the Gilbert sign
ordinance was adequately justified by the town’s interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.
The lower courts were untroubled by the logical problems with the town’s arguments that
Kagan identified because they did not encounter them. Rather than asking the town to
explain why it drew the distinctions it did, the lower courts asked only whether the
restrictions the sign code imposed on directional signs could be plausibly justified by
traffic safety and aesthetic concerns. The Ninth Circuit concluded, for example, that the
size restrictions the law imposed on the display of temporary directional signs “actually
advance[d]” the town’s aesthetic and safety interests because they did “not appear
substantially broader … than required to make sure the rights-of-way are not so thicketed
with signs as to pose a safety hazard or create an aesthetic blight.”100 At no point,
however, did the court require the town to explain why political and ideological signs—
which were allowed to be considerably larger than directional signs—did not pose an
equivalent threat to rights-of-way to cause the same problems.101 Nor did it require the
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town to produce any empirical evidence that directional signs posed the problems it said
they did.102
The Ninth Circuit failed to ask whether the distinctions the Sign Code drew were
justified because it found that the signs that fell into each of the exempted categories
were “not in competition” with one another and that “the erection of one type of
temporary sign does not preclude the placement of another.”103 But this is to mistake the
nature of the inquiry: what the analysis of the government’s justifications for
distinguishing between different kinds of speakers and different kinds of speech seeks to
ensure is not that those engaged in direct competition in the marketplace of ideas are
treated equally but instead that the government has legitimate reasons for acting as it
does. The Ninth Circuit’s application of the justified without reference test entirely failed
to achieve this aim.
The Ninth Circuit opinion is a striking but by no means exceptionally egregious
example of how leniently courts applied the justified without reference test in the years
prior to the Court’s decision in Reed. Courts engaged in a similarly cursory analysis of
the government’s justifications in many other cases. In Thorburn v Austin, 104 for
example, the Eighth Circuit held that a local law that prohibited the targeted picketing of
residences—and defined targeted picketing to mean picketing that was “directed towards
a specific person or persons”—was content-neutral because the city’s justification for the
law (namely, that it protected residential privacy and tranquility) had “nothing to do with
the content of the regulated speech.”105 The Court reached this conclusion even though
the city provided no evidence that targeted picketing posed a greater threat to residential
privacy and tranquility than other kinds of picketing, let alone evidence demonstrating
that it posed a greater threat to residential privacy for reasons other than the presumably
personal messages it conveyed.
Similarly, in, Norton v City of Springfield,106 the Seventh Circuit held that a city
law that prohibited panhandling—which it defined as the oral request for an immediate
donation of money—was content-neutral because it did not, on its face, distinguish
between speakers based on their viewpoint or message.107 In reaching this conclusion, the
court presumed that the distinction the law drew between oral requests for the immediate
donation of money and other kinds of oral requests was justified by the city’s interest in
protecting its residents against a particularly intrusive and disruptive kind of speech.108
But neither the court, nor the city, pointed to any evidence that panhandling, as the city
defined it, in fact posed any significant threat to the wellbeing of pedestrians in the
downtown area, or any more threat than other kinds of speech.109 Absent this kind of
102
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evidence, the court had no way of telling whether the city enacted the ordinance for the
purposes it claimed or instead did so to suppress unpopular speech.
By accepting the government’s justifications at face value, courts—in these and
other cases--essentially allowed the government to determine, through artful pleading, the
standard of review that applied to its speech regulations. The effect, as Mark Rienzi and
Stuart Buck noted critically, was to make the “justified without reference” test “a shallow
and easily evaded inquiry into whether the government [could] name just one neutral
purpose served by the law.”110
Given this shoddy record, one can well understand why, after decades of
vacillation on the question of what makes a law content-based, the Court was no longer
willing to put up with the “justified without reference” test, at least as applied to facially
content-based laws. And to the extent the rule announced in Reed makes it harder for the
government to “make an end run around the First Amendment” than was the case under
the pre-Reed regime, the decision represents a doctrinal step forward.111
The benefits that Reed produces, however, come with serious costs. This is
because, by requiring courts to treat all facially content-based laws as presumptively
invalid—at least to the extent they regulate speech to which the presumption against
content-based regulation applies—the decision will make it very difficult for the
government to defend even entirely legitimate laws against constitutional challenge. This
is because, although the Court has sometimes described the purpose of strict scrutiny to
be the “smok[ing] out [of] illegitimate [government purposes],” in fact the prophylactic
rule does much more than that. 112 By requiring the government to demonstrate a
compelling and not just a legitimate purpose, and that the means it has chosen to achieve
that end are the least restrictive possible, strict scrutiny makes it difficult to defend even
laws that are not the product of a bad intent. 113 The result is that Reed may imperil many
laws that employ content distinctions to achieve entirely legitimate aims. In this respect,
Reed extends the prophylactic rule of strict scrutiny further than the Court in other
contexts has been willing to go. The analogy to the law of race discrimination illuminates
just how broad the Reed test truly is.
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III. REED’S VICES
In insisting that all laws that employ either “obvious” or “subtle” content
distinctions should be considered, for constitutional purposes, presumptively invalid and
subject to strict scrutiny, the Reed majority articulated, what we might call, borrowing
from equal protection scholarship, an “anti-classificatory” test of content discrimination.
Equal protection scholars use the term anti-classification to refer to the view of
the Equal Protection Clause that has been dominant on the Court since at least the early
1990s.114 On this view, the government presumptively violates its obligation to provide
equal protection of the law whenever it classifies individuals on the basis of a limited
number of constitutionally “suspect” categories, such as race or nationality or alienage.115
Or, at least, on this view, the government presumptively discriminates whenever it
classifies individuals on the basis of a suspect category and the result is to burden or
benefit those classified.116 When the government acts in this way, proponents of this view
of the Equal Protection Clause insist that its actions will be constitutional only if they
satisfy strict scrutiny.117
Reed articulates an almost identical approach to the analysis of allegedly
discriminatory speech regulations. It too insists that whenever the government classifies
individuals on the basis of a constitutionally “suspect” category, and the result is to
burden or benefit those so classified, it acts presumptively unconstitutionally.118 The only
real difference between the Reed test of content discrimination and the test of
discrimination articulated in the Court’s recent equal protection cases is the identity of
the suspect categories. If, in the equal protection context, the categories that are
considered suspect are racial categories or categories of national origin or alien status, the
categories that Reed identifies as constitutionally suspect are instead content-based
categories. Indeed, the first question that Reed requires courts to ask when confronted
with an allegedly discriminatory content-based speech regulation is essentially the same
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question courts must ask when confronted with an allegedly discriminatory race-based
regulation: does the law treat individuals differently on a constitutionally suspect basis?
Nor is it only in its first step that the Reed test mirrors contemporary equal
protection doctrine. So too does its second step, which requires courts faced with a
speech regulation that does not make a facial content distinction to determine whether the
regulation was enacted in order to further illegitimate ends.119 This is essentially the same
inquiry that courts must engage in when faced with an equal protection challenge to a
facially neutral law. This is the case even though, in First Amendment cases, it is the
government that has the burden of demonstrating that a speech regulation is adequately
justified by a legitimate purpose and in equal protection cases, it is the litigant who bears
the burden of establishing the existence of a discriminatory purpose.120 In practice, this
differences matters very little, given how easy it is for the government to establish that a
facially neutral law is adequately justified and how difficult it is for litigants to establish a
discriminatory purpose.121 The result is that, after Reed, what will determine in the vast
majority of both free speech and equal protection cases whether strict scrutiny applies is
whether the challenged law employs a “suspect” classification on its face.
That Reed makes the rules that govern content discrimination cases so similar to
those that govern race discrimination cases is not entirely surprising. There are, after all,
deep continuities between First Amendment and equal protection law. In equal protection
law, for example, as in free speech law, the Court has tended to equate discrimination
with discriminatory purpose.122 And in both bodies of law, the tiered system of scrutiny
has come to serve essentially the same doctrinal function: by imposing very rigorous
scrutiny on constitutionally “suspect” laws, it “ensure[s] that courts are most skeptical in
cases in which it is highly predictable that illegitimate motives are at work” and less
skeptical in other cases.123
Nor are these the only similarities between these two bodies of law. As in its First
Amendment cases, the Court’s equal protection cases have generated sharp disagreement
among the justices about how broadly strict scrutiny should apply. For a time, this
disagreement produced the kind of vacillation in the Court’s race discrimination cases
that has characterized First Amendment doctrine. This is evident in the Court’s decisions
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s addressing equal protection challenges to affirmative
119
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action programs and to other minority empowerment policies that classified individuals
on the basis of race, but did so in order to integrate and equalize, rather than to segregate
and divide. In some cases, the Court insisted that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review in these cases; but in other cases the Court applied a less demanding
standard because it found that the purposes that led the government to enact these
programs were constitutionally legitimate. 124 In yet other cases, the Court failed to
articulate a standard of scrutiny at all, because it could not agree on what standard should
govern.125
In its equal protection cases, the Court struggled to decide, in other words,
between an anti-classificatory approach and a more purpose-oriented approach to racial
classifications—just as it struggled to decide, in its First Amendment jurisprudence,
between an anti-classificatory and a more purpose-oriented test of content discrimination.
In this respect, the histories of the two constitutional doctrines of discrimination are quite
similar.
In other respects, however, the histories of the two doctrines of discrimination are
quite dissimilar. In the Court’s equal protection cases, after several decades of uncertainty
and vacillation, the anti-classificatory view won the day. In 1995, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc v Pena,126 for example, the Court unequivocally rejected the possibility
that a benign governmental purpose could justify treating laws that classify on the basis
of race as anything less than constitutionally suspect. 127 In subsequent cases, the Court
has adhered to this position, despite persistent dissent.128
In the Court’s First Amendment cases, in contrast, the struggle between the two
tests of content discrimination continued for much longer. Justices who readily signed on
to the anti-classificatory view of equal protection continued to join—and even to
author—opinions in which the Court upheld as content-neutral laws that made content
distinctions on their face.129 The result was that, whereas the Court, by the mid-1990s,
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had firmly embraced the view that to stop discriminating on the basis of race, government
must stop classifying on the basis of race, the Court had not embraced the view that to
stop discriminating on the basis of content, one must stop classifying on the basis of
content.
It is Reed that brings the First Amendment doctrine of content discrimination and
the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of race discrimination into alignment. In so doing, it
makes it as difficult, at least in theory, for the government to make content distinctions as
racial distinctions.
It is not obvious, however, that the same rules that apply to all racially
classificatory laws should apply to all laws that classify on the basis of content. This is
because of what we might call the different ontological status of race and content in
American constitutional law.
A.

The Constitutional Irrelevance of Racial Distinctions

It is a basic principle of equal protection law that racial distinctions are “in most
circumstances irrelevant” to the government when it regulates.130 This is what the Court
asserted, in Hirabayashi v United States in 1943, to explain why “[d]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”131 Since then, the Court
has repeated that claim on multiple occasions, often without further elaboration or
exploration.132
The claim is not a self-evident one, however. After all, we live in a racially
stratified society, one in which racial and ethnic disparities are evident in almost all
arenas of public and private life. Racial differences are closely correlated to where people
live, their access to medical care, the likelihood that they will be victims of crime, and
many other economic, social, and political differences.133 There are consequently many
reasons, we might think, why the government might want to take race into account when
making regulatory policy that have nothing to do with prejudice or animus.
The Court has nevertheless refused to allow the government to take race into
account, even in response to the obvious racial differences in the society it governs. It has
made clear that, even when the government makes what appear to be rational racial
White, and O’Connor. Compare Renton, 475 US 41 (applying a purpose test of content discrimination)
with J.A. Croson Co, 488 US at 476 (plurality) (applying an anti-classificatory test of race discrimination)
(plurality). Others on the Court, meanwhile, were strong proponents of anticlassification in the First
Amendment context but strong critics of an anti-classificatory approach to equal protection. This was true,
for example of Justices Marshall and Brennan. Compare Renton, 475 US at 55–56 (Brennan dissenting)
with J.A. Croson Co, 488 US at 528–30 (Marshall dissenting).
130
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distinctions—that is to say, when it treats individuals differently because of observable,
even perhaps statistically significant, differences in the characteristics of different racial
groups—its actions offend the Equal Protection Clause.134
The Court’s refusal to allow the government to engage in what David Strauss has
described as “rational discrimination” reflects its underlying belief that race is a social
construct; or at least, that racial differences do not reveal anything about the individual’s
inherent “ability to perform or contribute to society.”135 Hence, the Court presumes that
differences in the characteristics of different racial groups are not inherent but the product
of centuries of racial subordination and inequality. They are the product of private biases,
in other words, to which the government cannot give effect without risking reinforcing.136
As a result, the situations in which the government may constitutionally take
racial differences into account are few and far between. The Court has acknowledged that
the government can take race into account in order to promote diversity in the university
setting, or to undo the effects of the government’s own prior acts of discrimination.137 But
in the vast majority of cases, the Court has taken the view that government may not treat
its citizens differently because of their race.138 The consequence is a public sphere in
which the explicit use of racial distinctions are extremely rare.
B.

The Constitutional Relevance of Content Distinctions

The situation is very different when it comes to content distinctions. Unlike racial
distinctions, content distinctions play a pervasive role in the regulation of both private
and public life.
Consider, for example, the rules that govern the private workplace. Federal labor
laws prohibit employers from engaging in certain kinds of speech during union election
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campaigns.139 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as many state and local
laws, prohibit the use of speech that creates a hostile work environment.140 Health and
safety regulations require employers to post signs containing certain kinds of information
where their workers can see them. 141 Rules of professional conduct—rules that the
government helps to enforce—govern what doctors and lawyers may say when talking to
their clients, or when soliciting new work.142
All of these rules involve distinctions between certain kinds of speech and
others—distinctions that ultimately depend on the content of the expression. What
employers are prohibited from doing under federal labor law is expressing certain
messages (such as, for example, that a union strike will cause the workplace to close).143
What workers are prohibited from doing under Title VII is expressing certain kinds of
messages (such as, “you’re a slut”).144 What doctors are prohibited from doing is giving
their patients medically unsound advice.145 What employers are required to do under a
plethora of federal laws is conveying specific information to their workers.146
Although some of these rules have proven to be more controversial than others,
courts have recognized that the government has legitimate reasons to regulate speech in
these ways.147 They have recognized, for example, that the government can penalize
139
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harassing speech in order to ensure equality of access to the workplace;148 that it can limit
employer speech during union election campaigns in order to ensure that union elections
are free and fair; 149 and that it can limit the speech of doctors and lawyers in order to
promote the integrity of their professions and the wellbeing of their patients and
clients.150 The widespread recognition that content-based distinctions play an important
role in the regulation of the workplace helps explain why the standard of means-end
scrutiny that applies in work environments tends to be relatively lenient, and why the
strong presumption against content-based regulation does not apply.
Even when it comes to the regulation of speech in the public sphere—to speech to
which the presumption against content-based restrictions does apply—content
distinctions play an important regulatory role. This is true even though the range of
purposes that may legitimately motivate the government to employ content distinctions in
the public sphere is more limited than when it regulates in the private sphere. This is
because First Amendment doctrine recognizes the distinction between what Immanuel
Kant famously described as the “public” and the “private use of one’s reason.”151 That is
to say, it recognizes, or at least presumes, that speech that addresses itself to a public
audience is especially important to the marketplace of ideas. 152 Thus, when the
government regulates public speech, the constitutional constraints on its authority are
much greater. In such cases, the government is barred not only from punishing speech
because it dislikes it, as it is prohibited from doing when it regulates the private sphere,153
at 1807 (cited in note 140) (“Many harassment cases involve truly harrowing abuse, abuse that can shut
women and minorities out of the workplace almost as surely as would explicit discrimination in hiring.”).
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but when it pursues legitimate ends via paternalistic means.154 For example, in contrast to
when the government regulates private speech, when the government regulates public
speech, it may not limit the speech of the more powerful in order to protect the less
powerful against indirect forms of threat and coercion. Instead, it may prohibit coercive
speech only when it represents a “serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”155 Nor may the
government limit speech because it may persuade people to do bad things, or because it is
offensive or threatening to the status quo, as it can when it regulates in the private
sphere.156
Even given these constraints, though, there are good reasons why the government
might want to, and regularly does, make content distinctions when regulating the speech
of public citizens. Consider, for example, privacy laws. Laws of this sort frequently
prohibit the use or distribution—including the public use and distribution—of personally
identifiable information. 157 They make, in other words, a content-based distinction
between information that can be used to identify a person and information that cannot.
We can well understand why the government might want to employ a distinction of this
sort. This is because the unconstrained dissemination of such information poses a
distinction threat to personal privacy.158
We cannot therefore presume that when the government distinguishes between
these two kinds of information it does so in an attempt to “control the search for truth” or
to “give one side on a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to
the public.” Nor is it necessarily acting paternalistically. In fact, it is highly unlikely that
when the government regulates personal information its motive is to prevent people from
being persuaded by “bad” speech to do bad things, or to shield them from offensive or
unpleasant speech. The best explanation of these laws is that they represent an effort to
154
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Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003).
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See, for example, Waters, 511 US at 672 (noting that while, when it comes to the regulation of
public speech “[t]he First Amendment demands a tolerance of verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance, as necessary side effects of . . . the process of open debate,. . . a government employer may bar
its employees from using . . . offensive utterance[s] to members of the public or to the people with whom
they work”; and that “though a private person is perfectly free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state
governor’s legislative program, we have never suggested that the Constitution bars the governor from firing
a high-ranking deputy for doing the same thing”) (quotation marks omitted); Post, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 977
(cited in note 37) (“[W]hen physicians address the general public, they are . . . free to express themselves as
they wish, without the constraints of ordinary professional responsibility. But when physicians speak to us
as our personal doctors, they must assume a fiduciary obligation faithfully and expertly to communicate the
considered knowledge of the ‘medical community.’”).
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See, for example, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy
Rule, 45 CFR § 164.502 (imposing significant constraints on the use and dissemination of “individually
identifiable health information”); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DDPA”), 18 USC § 2721 et seq
(prohibiting individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from motor vehicle
records); See generally Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L J 967, 971–73 (2003) (describing the many and varied state and federal
laws that regulate the disclosure of personal information).
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As the Court has recognized, “[t]he capacity of technology to find and publish personal
information … presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it
seeks to secure.” Sorrell, 564 US at 579.
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protect individual autonomy, by allowing individuals to maintain some control over who
knows what about them.159
This is not to say that privacy laws pose no First Amendment problems. Like any
regulations of speech, they can be employed for bad purposes. And when they deprive the
press or other relevant actors of important information on matters of public concern, they
can undermine the quality of public debate and thereby violate the First Amendment.160
But there is nothing inherently problematic about privacy laws from a standpoint of
discriminatory purpose—which is why courts have frequently upheld the constitutionality
of such laws when they restrict speech that does not touch on “matters of public
concern.”161
The same is true of many other kinds of facially content-based regulations of
public speech. Consider, for example, campaign finance laws. These frequently impose
restrictions on electioneering speech that are not imposed on other kinds of speech.162
This is a content distinction—what makes something electioneering speech is the fact that
it refers to a candidate for elected office.163 Yet the Court has recognized that the
government has a compelling interest in regulating electoral speech in order to preserve
the integrity of the electoral process.164
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The Court has recognized on multiple occasions the important First Amendment interests
promoted by privacy laws. See, for example, Bartnicki, 532 US at 532–33 (noting that “[p]rivacy of
communication is an important interest” and that “the fear of public disclosure of private conversations
might well have a chilling effect on private speech”); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 483 (1965)
(“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
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In such cases, the Court has not hesitated to strike laws of this kind down. See, for example,
Florida Star, 491 US 524; Smith v Daily Mail Publishing Co, 443 US 97 (1979).
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See, for example, Dahlstrom v Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F3d 937, 949 (7th Cir 2015)
(upholding the DDPA against constitutional challenge on the grounds that the government has a “legitimate
interest in preventing stalkers and criminals [from] acquir[ing] personal information from state DMVs”)
(quotations omitted); Law School Admission Council, Inc v State, 222 Cal App 4th 1265, 1271–72 (2014),
as modified (Feb 11, 2014) (reversing injunction against enforcement of California law that prohibited the
LSAC from informing law schools that candidates received an accommodation when taking the LSAT);
Individual Reference Services Group, Inc v FTC, 145 F Supp 2d 6, 43–44 (DDC 2001), affd sub nom;
Trans Union LLC v FTC, 295 F3d 42 (DC Cir 2002) (upholding constitutionality of regulation that requires
banks to inform customers when using or disseminating their personally identifiable information).
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See, for example, 52 USC § 30104(f) (imposing detailed reporting requirements on anyone
who “makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in
an aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year”); 52 USCA § 3012(a) (requiring
electioneering communications to clearly state if funded and/or authorized by a political committee, or
candidate, or by some other source).
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11 CFR § 100.29 (defining electioneering communications as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication that: (1) [r]efers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly
distributed within 60 days before a general election . . .; or within 30 days before a primary or preference
election [and] (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate, in the case of a candidate for Senate or the House
of Representatives”).
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Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 370–71 (2010) (“With the advent
of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters.
. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 66–68 (1976) (noting that disclosure requirements
“provide[] the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from . . . [and
therefore aid] the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office . . .[,] deter actual corruption and avoid
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Or consider the many laws that prohibit making false statements to government
agents or falsely claiming to be a government agent.166 In distinguishing between true
and false speech, these laws make an obvious content distinction. Nevertheless, it is easy
to understand why he government might want to penalize false speech to and about
government agents. This is because false speech creates harms that true speech does not:
it undermines the integrity of government processes. It undermines the ability of law
enforcement to effectively investigate crime, the ability of federal agents to distribute
benefits in accordance with law, and the ability of the public to trust that government
officials are who they say they are.167
These examples merely hint at the diverse range of contexts in which content
distinctions help the government tailor its coercive force to the specific harms that
different kinds of speech can create. Indeed, one can easily come up with many other
examples of content distinctions that, until Reed, played a relatively unproblematic role in
the regulation of the public sphere. Sign laws, for example, regularly distinguish between
directional and non-directional signs.168 Federal aviation law requires pilots to ensure that
passengers are provided specific safety information at the beginning of all flights.169
Right of publicity laws impose penalties on those who misappropriate another person’s
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the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity . . .
[and provide] the data necessary to detect violations of [campaign finance laws]”).
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See, for example, 18 USC § 1001 (making it a crime to knowingly and willfully “make[] any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or make[] or use[] any false writing or
document . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States”); Ala Code § 13A-10-9 (making it a crime to “knowingly make[] a false
report . . . to law enforcement authorities of a crime or relating to a crime”); DC Code Ann § 5-117.05
(same); Fla Stat Ann § 817.49 (same). For a list of dozens of similar laws, see United States v Gaudin, 28
F3d 943, 961 n 3 and 4 (9th Cir 1994) (Kozinski dissenting).
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officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency, or officer
thereof, and acts as such”); 18 USC § 709 (prohibiting a speaker’s unauthorized use of federal agencies’
names in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that the speaker’s message was
approved or endorsed by the agency).
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Courts have recognized as much. See, for example, Bryson v United States, 396 US 64, 70
(1969) (noting the “valid legislative interest in protecting the integrity of official inquiries”); People v
Morera-Munoz, 210 Cal Rptr 3d 409, 420 (Ct App 2016) (holding that a state law that prohibited the
making of false reports to police officers protected against “th[o]se falsities [that] have the potential to
corrupt an official investigation”); United States v Barnow, 239 US 74, 78 (1915) (“In order that the vast
and complicated operations of the government of the United States shall be carried on successfully and
with a minimum of friction and obstruction, it is important . . . that a spirit of respect and good will for the
government and its officers shall generally prevail. And what could more directly impair this spirit than to
permit unauthorized and unscrupulous persons to go about the country falsely assuming, for fraudulent
purposes, to be entitled to the respect and credit due to an officer of the government?”).
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See, for example, Dover, Del Code of Ordinances, Pt II, App B, Art 5, § 4.5(F) (exempting
directional signs from general licensing requirement provided such signs are no more than three square feet
in size). City of Fort Worth Sign Ordinance, 6.403 (exempting from general permit requirement
“[w]arning, security and directional signs for parking or vehicle access” as well as “informational,
directional or traffic signs”).
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14 CFR § 136.7 (requiring pilots to ensure before takeoff that each passenger has been briefed
on emergency and smoking regulations).
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name or likeness for their own economic benefit.170 National security laws criminalize
the distribution of material containing secret or classified information.171
The fact that content distinctions play such an important role in regulation reflects
what we might call the different ontological status of content and racial distinctions in
contemporary constitutional law. It reflects the fact that, in contrast to racial distinctions,
the Court does not consider content distinctions to be merely social constructions—the
product of unjust social forces, mystifications that hide from us our essential humanity.
Instead, it recognizes that content distinctions sometimes reflect real differences in the
characteristics of different kinds of speech.172 Or at least, it recognizes this to be true of
content distinctions other than those based on viewpoint.
The Court has not upheld an explicitly viewpoint-based regulation of public
speech in almost thirty years.173 One could thus interpret the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence as establishing the principle that viewpoint distinctions—like racial
distinctions—are so rarely relevant to the government’s legitimate aims that they are, for
all intents and purposes, impermissible mechanisms of lawmaking.174
The same is not true, however, of other kinds of content distinctions, which the
Court has, on many occasions, upheld. And certainly the Court has never suggested that,
when making these kinds of content distinctions, the government may not rely upon
generalizations about the characteristics of the different kinds of speech. It has instead
insisted that when the government relies upon generalizations, they should be
accurate.175 The result is that there are many contexts in which the government can, and
regularly does, take subject matter—and various other kinds of content—distinctions into
account.
170

See, for example, Cal Civ Code § 3344 (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons
injured as a result thereof.”); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2741.02 (prohibiting the use of “any aspect of an
individual’s persona for a commercial purpose” for a period of sixty years after their death).
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See, for example, 18 USC § 793; 18 USC § 798.
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This helps explain why content distinctions play such an important role in the doctrinal rules
the Court applies in First Amendment cases. See Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 Va L Rev 203, 211–14 (1982).
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The last case in which the Court upheld a viewpoint-based regulation of high-value speech
was, as far as I can discern, Meese v Keene, 481 US 465 (1987) (upholding law imposing registration
requirements on foreign agents who disseminate “political propaganda,” defined to include material which
“advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or
other conflict involving the use of force or violence”). Even still, the Court upheld the law as constitutional
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480.
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Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 200 (cited in note 90) (noting the Court’s tendency to apply
strict scrutiny even to modest viewpoint-based laws).
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See, for example, Mosley, 408 US at 100 (holding that city may not prohibit some types of
pickets but not others unless it demonstrates “that [the] picketing [it prohibits] is clearly more disruptive
than the picketing [it] already permits”); Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Distict, 393
US 503, 508–09 (1969) (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. . . . In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
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C.

The Consequence of the Difference Between Content and Race

The fact that the government may employ content distinctions to further all sorts
of ends but may not employ racial distinctions undermines the implicit analogy that Reed
draws between the law of content discrimination and the law of race discrimination. This
is because one of the primary justifications the Court has provided for treating all laws
that employ racial classifications as suspect is that there are so few legitimate reasons for
government to employ such distinctions, thus suggesting improper motivation when it
does so. As Justice White explained in Cleburne v Cleburne Texas Living Center:176
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. … The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by
race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in
the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.177
The irrelevance of racial distinctions is not the only justification the Court has
provided for treating all racially classificatory laws as suspect. It has also argued that
laws that employ racial distinctions are especially likely to be the product of invidious
motivations, given the “long and tragic” history out of which they emerge.178 It has also
suggested that laws that employ racial distinctions are particularly problematic because
they discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic—one for which the
individual bears no responsibility.179
The Court has nevertheless made clear that, even if not a sufficient condition for
suspect class status, the fact that race is “seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest” is a necessary condition for it. Conversely, the Court has made
clear that classifications that do not share these characteristics need not be subjected to
strict scrutiny. In Cleburne, for example, the Court explained that mental disability
should not count as a suspect or even semi-suspect classification for equal protection
purposes because legislation … singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the
176

473 US 432 (1985).
Id at 440.
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unequal treatment”) (quotation marks omitted).
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Frontiero, 411 US at 686 (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the
members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”) (quotation marks omitted);
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart dissenting) (“The color of a person’s skin and the
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real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others”—differences that were
“not only legitimate but desirable” for the government to take into account.180 Hence, the
Court argued, to treat the mentally disabled as a suspect or semi-suspect class would do
more harm than good, because although “legislation designed to benefit, rather than
disadvantage, the retarded would generally withstand examination under a test of
heightened scrutiny . . . merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms
may lead it to refrain from acting at all.”181 And, indeed, the affirmative action cases
provide a vivid illustration of how severe a constraint on government power the
declaration of suspect class status can be.182
There is no reason to think that a similar concern with the constraining and even
perhaps chilling effects of strict scrutiny should not apply in the First Amendment
context as well. Here too, the Court has long recognized, as we saw in Part I, that the
regulation of speech furthers important constitutional as well as extra-constitutional
goals. For that reason, the Court should be as concerned about the costs of strict scrutiny
in the First Amendment as in the equal protection context.
And yet, if the same concerns apply, the Reed test starts to look much less
attractive. This is because, given the many legitimate reasons the government has to
make content distinctions when it regulates speech, what Reed seems to require is the
application of strict scrutiny to many laws that are not in fact the product of a
discriminatory purpose. And given how difficult it is for the government to satisfy the
demands of strict scrutiny, the likely result will be to invalidate many laws that are not
discriminatory, as the Court understands the term.183
Nor can the Reed test easily by justified by recourse to a theory of discriminatory
effect. Even if one rejected the focus on discriminatory purpose, and instead construed
strict scrutiny as a defense against regulations that are particularly likely to disparately
effect the expression of particular ideas or topics, Reed would still require applying strict
scrutiny to many laws that do not pose a significant threat to First Amendment interests.
This is because the presence or absence of content classifications is not a reliable
predictor of a law’s disparate effects. Some facially content-based laws may have a very
modest impact on the ability of speakers to communicate. 184 Laws prohibiting the
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race, doctrines of heightened scrutiny are functioning primarily as a check on affirmative action
programs.”). See also David Schraub, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, 84 UMKC L Rev 859 (2016)
(arguing that supporters of gay rights should not push the Court for suspect class status because doing so
would limit, rather than enhance, their ability to protect their interests in the political process).
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One could make the same argument about the use of strict scrutiny to review affirmative action
laws. This is because the Court has recognized that, when the government acts to regulate admissions to
universities, there are at least two legitimate, even “compelling,” reasons why it might want to take race
into account—namely, to promote diversity and remedy past racial discrimination. Parents Involved, 551
US at 721–22. In these cases, as well, the application of strict scrutiny may therefore result in the
invalidation of many laws that are not in fact a product of impermissible purposes. The argument is
somewhat weaker in the affirmative action context, however, given the fewer range of permissible purposes
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speech regulations. Nevertheless, the same logic holds.
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the message from being communicated” and that “[t]o the contrary, such restrictions are often limited in
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impersonation of government officers, for example, burden speech only minimally. They
prevent speakers from falsely pretending to be government officials, but not from
criticizing, condemning, or praising government officers. 185 As a result, they seem
unlikely to have anything close to a significant disparate impact on the ability of different
speakers to participate in the marketplace of ideas. The same is true of many other
facially content-based laws.186
Other content-based distinctions, meanwhile, operate to lessen the disparate
effects of a law, by exempting or partially exempting from its operation those who are
most likely to be severely burdened by it.187 The result is that many facially contentbased laws are unlikely to have the kind of disparate effects that critics have argued First
Amendment doctrine should take into account.188
What this means is that Reed likely imperils many laws that pose no significant
threat to First Amendment interests. This is certainly what Justice Kagan argued in her
concurring opinion in Reed, which Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined.189 Contra the
majority claim that strict scrutiny is the correct standard of review whenever the
government employs regulatory distinctions that turn on the content of speech, Kagan
argued that it is only when there is a “realistic possibility that [the] official suppression of
ideas is afoot,” that courts should—and had in the past—applied strict scrutiny.190 By
refusing to employ this “common sense” approach to the content neutrality analysis,
Kagan argued, the majority imperiled thousands of “eminently reasonable” sign laws for
no good reason.191
There is some evidence already, just two years after the decision was handed
down, that Justice Kagan was correct when she predicted that Reed would result in the
invalidation of many “eminently reasonable” laws. Indeed, by focusing entirely on
Reed’s impact on sign laws, Justice Kagan may have underestimated the impact of the
decision. In Reed’s aftermath, lower courts have relied upon the decision to strike down

scope, restricting expression in only narrowly defined circumstances.”). id at 219 (noting that the disparate
effects of facially content-based laws is not necessarily greater than the disparate effects of facially contentneutral laws that impose only a modest burden on expression).
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188
Susan Williams has argued, for example, that the Court has understood the anti-discrimination
principle too narrowly to adequately protect free speech interests and that laws that “reduc[e] the
availability of [particular] point[s] of view in the marketplace” or that “remove[] certain symbols or
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not only sign laws192 but also panhandling laws,193 election laws,194 trademark laws,195
and even state right-of-publicity statutes.196
In at least some of these cases, it is far from obvious what First Amendment
interests have been vindicated. Consider for example two recent decisions in which
courts applied Reed to strike down facially content-based regulations of speech.
Billboard Control
The first case involved a constitutional challenge to the Texas Highway
Beautification Act.197 The Texas law was enacted in 1972 in response to the passage of
the Federal Highway Beautification Act, which, in an effort to “protect the public
investment in . . highways, . . . promote the safety and recreational value of public travel,
and . . . preserve natural beauty” required states to impose strict limits on what
“advertising signs, displays, and devices” could be erected adjacent to its interstate
highways or risk losing a substantial portion of their federal highway funding.198 As
required by the federal law, the Texas Highway Beautification Act prohibited the display,
outside of urban areas, of any advertising signs or devices within 660 feet of the interstate
highways.199 Like the federal law, however, it carved out a limited number of exemptions
from the general ban on advertising signs and devices. It exempted, for example,
“directional [signs], including advertising pertaining to a natural wonder or a scenic or
historic attraction”; “outdoor advertising for the sale or lease of the property on which it
is located”; “outdoor advertising solely for activities conducted on the property on which
it is located”; and “outdoor advertising erected on or before October 22, 1965, that [is]
determine[d] to be a landmark of such historic or artistic significance that preservation is
consistent with the purposes of [the Act].”200
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See, for example, Central Radio Co Inc v City of Norfolk, Va, 811 F3d 625, 629 (4th Cir 2016)
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The Act distinguished between permitted and prohibited billboards by reference
to their content. In a pre-Reed decision, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the law as a
reasonable content-neutral regulation of speech because it found it was adequately
justified by the government’s legitimate interest in “stemming visual clutter on the
landscape, . . . and promoting travel safety.”201
Reed changed the rules of the game, however, and when a constitutional challenge
to the Texas law was brought before the Texas Court of Appeals in 2016, it concluded
that the law should now be considered a content-based regulation of speech to which
strict scrutiny applied.202 After a very cursory analysis of the relationship between the
Highway Beautification Act’s means and ends, the court found that the law could not
satisfy strict scrutiny because the signs it exempted from its billboard ban were not
categorically less ugly or less dangerous to the traveling public than the signs it
banned.203 The court therefore concluded that the Act was therefore fatally underinclusive
with respect to the goal of preventing visual clutter and enhancing traffic safety.204
This conclusion is understandable given the tight fit between statutory means and
statutory ends that strict scrutiny requires. Indeed, the Court has held that a law fails strict
scrutiny if it fails to restrict a significant amount of speech that threatens the same kind of
harm as the speech it does restrict. 205 This is because, as noted in Part I, such
underinclusiveness casts doubt on the legislature’s purported motivations for the law.
In the context of the Texas Highway Beautification Act, though, the statutory
exemptions do not cast doubt on the legislature’s motivations. This is so because to the
extent they privilege any particular type of speech it is speech about historically
significant places located near the highway and speech advertising goods and services
located adjacent to the highway (gas stations, as well as antique stores).206 This is
precisely the kind of speech the state would logically want to privilege if it was trying to
promote the recreational value of public travel—which of course was exactly what
Congress was trying to do when it passed the Highway Beautification Act, and what the
Texas legislature claimed it was trying to do when it enacted the Texas Beautification
Act.207
Nor are there other reasons to be concerned about the law’s effect on free speech.
Its impact on the marketplace of ideas is unlikely to be significantly distorting. Although
the Act privileges speech about attractions and activities located near the highway, it does
not privilege or burden any particular ideas or messages or topics. Directional markers
201
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can direct travelers to all kinds of places. Local advertising signs can advertise all kinds
of goods. And the law defines advertising broadly to include noncommercial as well as
commercial messages.208 In fact, at least some of the statutory exemptions can reasonably
be understood as efforts by Congress, and by proxy, by the Texas legislature, to lessen
the distorting effects of the Act by exempting from its application those most likely to
have no other feasible alternative than highway billboards to advertise their goods and
services to the public: namely, those small businesses located along the side of the
road.209
The most obvious reading of the law, in other words, is that it represents an effort
to reconcile a number of important but competing interests: on the one hand, its aesthetic
interest in the “natural beauty” of the landscape; on the other hand, its interest in the
safety and convenience of the traveling public; and on the third hand, its interest in
ensuring that the Act does not deprive those who rely especially upon highway
advertising to communicate information about their products, land, or services of what
for them is an important means of communicating. This is the kind of reconciling of
interests that legislatures are routinely allowed to do when they enact content-neutral
laws..210
It is therefore not surprising that, when characterized as content-neutral, the Texas
Highway Beautification Act was found to be sufficiently narrowly-tailored to survive
constitutional scrutiny but, when characterized as content-based, it was not. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how any of the remaining forty-nine state highway beautification acts, or
the federal law, will be able to survive strict scrutiny, given the stringent tailoring now
required by Reed.211 In fact, a Tennessee court recently issued an injunction against
208
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enforcement of the Tennessee Billboard Act after finding, on similar grounds as the
Texas court, that the plaintiff had a strong likelihood of succeeding on his First
Amendment challenge to the Act.212 It is nevertheless hard to see what First Amendment
interests are promoted by requiring Congress and the states either to prohibit all highway
billboards or to prohibit none of them. Yet this is what the Texas decision portends.
Robocalls
Consider now a second post-Reed case—this time involving a First Amendment
challenge to South Carolina’s anti-robocall law. 213 The law prohibited the use of
automatic dialing devices to make unsolicited phone calls (“robocalls”) for commercial
and some political purposes.214 The law exempted from its general ban calls made to
persons with whom the robocaller had an existing or previous business relationship but
imposed numerous restrictions on those robocalls that were allowed.215
Robert Cahaly, a Republican political consultant, challenged the law on First
Amendment grounds after he was charged with illegally making political robocalls in six
South Carolina legislative districts in the weeks leading up to an election.216 Invoking
Reed, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the law as a content-based regulation of speech.217
The court assumed, for purposes of argument, that the law furthered a compelling state
interest—namely, it protected residential privacy and tranquility from the unwanted
intrusion of unsolicited robocalls. 218 It nevertheless found that the law failed strict
scrutiny because it was not the least restrictive means by which the state could have
promoted this compelling interest. The court argued that, rather than banning only select
robocalls, South Carolina could have protected residential privacy by imposing time-ofday limitations, requiring mandatory disclosure of the robocaller’s identity, or creating a
do-not-call-list.219
This conclusion follows naturally from Reed. The least restrictive means
requirement has been an integral part of the strict scrutiny analysis for many decades;220 it
has been justified as yet another means by which courts ensure that the government’s
motivations are what it says they are.221
In this case, however, the fact that South Carolina did not employ what the court
considered to be the least restrictive means available does not suggest that its motivations
for enacting the anti-robocall law were censorial. This is so because all of the supposed
212

Schroer, 127 F Supp 3d at 874–75 (finding that the Tennessee Billboard Act was content-based
but unlikely to satisfy strict scrutiny because it was “hopelessly underinclusive”).
213
Cahaly, 796 F3d 399.
214
Id at 402.
215
Id at 402–03 (quoting SC Code Ann § 16-17-446) (noting that the law required permitted
robocalls to “disconnect immediately when the called party hangs up”; [to be] made between 8:00 AM and
7:00 PM” and required those who made robocalls to disclose their identity and the purpose of the call to
those they called).
216
Id at 404.
217
Id at 402.
218
Id at 405.
219
Id.
220
Playboy, 529 US at 813; Sable Communications of Cal, Inc v FCC, 492 US 115, 126 (1989).
221
See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 231 (cited in note 90) (interpreting the requirement as a
means of ensuring that “the government would have adopted the restriction even in the absence of improper
motivation”).

37

less-restrictive alternatives have obvious and significant weaknesses. There is by now
plenty of evidence that do-not-call lists provide relatively weak protection against the
problem of robocalls.222 Mandatory disclosure does little to prevent one of the problems
associated with robocalls: namely, the annoying ringing of the telephone, particularly at
dinnertime.223 And, of course, time-of-day limitations preserve residential privacy only
during certain times of the day.
One can therefore well understand why South Carolina might have chosen to
address the problem of robocalls directly, by means of a ban on some robocalls. The
problem of invasive robocalls exists almost entirely because of commercial telemarketers
who, over the past three decades, have increasingly turned to inexpensive automated
calling technology to reach consumers.224 The result has been what some have described
as an “epidemic” of robocalling.225 As the FTC noted in 2013 testimony to the Senate,
complaints about commercial robocalls increased from 63,000 per month in the fourth
quarter of 2009 to 200,000 per month in the fourth quarter of 2012.226 There is also some
evidence that consumers perceive commercial robocalls—robocalls made by
telemarketers—as more invasive than robocalls made by schools, charitable
organizations, and other nonprofit entities. Indeed, this is precisely what Congress found
in 1991, when it enacted the federal anti-robocall law, the Telephone Consumer
Protections Act.227
222
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By prohibiting commercial but not charitable robocalls—by making it illegal to
use an automated dialing device to sell products but allowing it to be used to invite
friends to a birthday party or to send out a weather forecast—South Carolina was not
making an arbitrary, and therefore presumably invidious, distinction.228 It was instead
targeting the primary source of the evil it was trying to combat.
This is not to say that the South Carolina law was unproblematic. In addition to
prohibiting commercial robocalls, it also prohibited some political robocalls.229 The state
was unable to provide any evidence to the court for why these kinds of robocalls posed a
more serious threat to residential privacy than the nonprofit robocalls the law
permitted.230 In this respect, the law was, as the Fourth Circuit noted, overinclusive,
insofar as it prohibited both speech the state had reason to believe posed a particular
threat to residential privacy and speech that didn’t.231
Nothing in the Fourth Circuit opinion turned on the overinclusivity of the South
Carolina law, however. It was its failure to employ the least restrictive means available to
protecting residential privacy that doomed the law. This suggests that the Fourth Circuit
would have struck down the law had South Carolina, like many states and the federal
government, prohibited only unsolicited commercial robocalls. Yet it is not clear what
First Amendment interests would be advanced by doing so. There is little reason to
believe that these laws are the product of a discriminatory purpose. Nor is their impact on
the marketplace of ideas likely to be significant. The South Carolina law, like the federal
and many similar state anti-robocall laws, do not prohibit phone calls; they merely
prohibit automated phone calls.232
By raising the costs of making robocalls, these laws attempt to encourage those
who use this device to be more selective in whom they call. Given pervasive consumer
unhappiness with the problem of unwanted robocalls, this does not seem to be an
unreasonable thing for the legislature to attempt to do. And yet, in the name of expressive
equality, Reed imperils these, as well as other, anti-robocall laws.
C.

Implications

These examples demonstrate how difficult Reed makes it for the government to defend
facially content-based laws against constitutional challenge, even when there are good
reasons for the government to employ the content distinctions it did. They give some idea
of why, although the ideal of the colorblind society has long been an aspirational trope
(wrongly or rightly) in equal protection law, free speech law has never been organized
around the ideal of a content-blind society. This is because what Paul Brest argued was
228
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true of racial classifications is absolutely not true of content classifications: namely, they
do not “correlate[] so weakly with the legitimate characteristics for which [they] might be
used as a proxy that … society loses little if they are presumptively forbidden.” 233
Instead, the costs may be significant.
Of course, any system of prophylactic rules is likely to result in the invalidation of
some laws that do not pose the problem the prophylaxis is designed to combat. That is the
nature of prophylactic rules, and what makes them both useful and frequently
controversial. 234 In this case, however the number of false positives that Reed is likely to
produce is higher than the Court has indicated, in its equal protection cases at least, it will
ordinarily allow.
That it is willing to allow a significant number of entirely legitimate speech
regulations to be invalidated under the Reed test presumably reflects the Court’s view
that there is no adequate alternative test of content-based lawmaking, given the very
evident problems with the “justified without reference” test canvassed in Part II. This is
not an unreasonable belief, but as the next Part argues, it may be a mistaken one. This is
because it is far from obvious that the problems with the justification test are an
inevitable feature of the test, or evidence of lower courts’ unwillingness to protect speech
unless absolutely forced to do so by the Court. Instead, many of the problems with the
justified test can be blamed on the Court itself. In this respect, Reed may be a case of
chickens coming home to roost: the Court turning to an extremely broad test of contentbased lawmaking in response to its own failure to interpret the more nuanced “justified
without reference” test with rigor.
What this suggests is that, even if the test of content-based lawmaking that Reed
announces is an improvement over what came before, it may nevertheless represent a
second-best solution to the very serious problem of pretextual discrimination—and one
that is likely to create significant doctrinal problems in the future.
IV. ALTERNATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS
The fact that the anti-classificatory test of content-based lawmaking that Reed
announces imposes such significant constraints on the government’s legitimate regulatory
authority suggests that the decision should be considered a good solution to the problem
of pretextual discrimination only if there are no other, less restrictive but equally effective
means of guarding against the repressive impulses of both judges and legislatures.
One might think, given the discussion of pre-Reed lower court opinions in Part II,
that there isn’t: that when provided with the more discretionary “justified without
reference to content” test of content-based lawmaking, lower courts failed to interpret it
in a way that vigorously enforced free speech values or protected speakers against
pretextual discrimination. Given that record, one might argue that a highly formal, brightline test like the one announced in Reed provides the only effective, if imperfect, means
of enforcing the First Amendment’s anti-discrimination principle.235
(1976).
(1988).
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It is not obvious, however, that this is true. Although lower courts tended to apply
the “justified without reference” test in the years prior to Reed in an overly lenient
manner, there is no reason to assume that this leniency was due to the lower courts’
refusal to vigorously enforce the speech-protective rules the Supreme Court handed them.
To the contrary, in taking the government’s claimed justifications at face value, the lower
courts were simply following the Court’s own example. Indeed, almost all of the
problems with the lower courts’ approach to the justification inquiry during this period
can be traced to the Supreme Court itself.
A.

The Devolution of the Justification Test

In Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 236 the Court first
articulated the general framework for cases involving potentially discriminatory
regulations of public speech. The case involved a Chicago ordinance that prohibited the
picketing of city public schools while they were in session and for half an hour before
and after school was in session but that made an exception for picketing that occurred
outside schools involved in labor disputes.237 The city interpreted the ordinance to ban all
kinds of picketing outside schools (including schools involved in labor disputes) except
labor pickets.238 The Court concluded that, construed as such, the ordinance violated both
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment because it restricted speech
because of its content.239
The Court reached the conclusion that the ordinance was content-based because
the city was unable to offer any legitimate reason for the distinction between labor and
non-labor picketing. The city argued, for example, that it prohibited picketing, except for
labor pickets, near schools in order to prevent disruption of the educational experience.
The Court rejected this argument because the government provided no evidence
demonstrating that non-labor pickets were more disruptive than labor pickets. “Although
preventing school disruption is a city’s legitimate concern,” Justice Marshall noted,
“Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours is not an
undue interference with school. Therefore . . . Chicago may not maintain that other
picketing disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly more disruptive than the
picketing Chicago already permits.”240
Similarly, the Court rejected the government’s claim that it exempted labor
pickets from the law in order to avoid intruding on a sphere of activity normally governed
by federal labor law.241 It rejected this argument because it found that the city’s desire to
avoid the legal headaches caused by the potentially preemptive effect of federal labor law
Schuster was superior to the alternative because, as a bright-line test, it generated results that were “less
likely to be distorted by heuristics of fear and outrage” and therefore was “well adapted to counterbalance
[the] predictable cognitive biases that warp [judicial] judgments.” Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1316,
1318 (cited in note 15).
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was insufficient to justify the labor exemption. “This attenuated interest,” Marshall wrote,
“at best a claim of small administrative convenience and perhaps merely a confession of
legislative laziness, cannot justify the blanket permission given to labor picketing and the
blanket prohibition applicable to others.”242
Mosley established the principle that what is required to justify a speech
regulation that involves “differential treatment” on the basis of content is clear evidence
that the distinction actually furthers, or is likely to further, a significant governmental
interest. In Carey v Brown, eight years later, the Court re-emphasized this point when it
insisted, in the course of striking down a similar law, that “[w]hen government regulation
discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum . . . any distinctions it
draws must be carefully scrutinized.”243
In subsequent decisions, however, the Court failed to insist on clear evidence that
the distinctions speech regulations drew actually furthered an “appropriate government
interest.” Instead, it interpreted the justification test to require only evidence showing that
the government did not intend to repress ideas.
Renton provides perhaps the most egregious example of the Court’s tendency, in
these cases, to shy away from a rigorous application of Mosley. As noted earlier, Renton
involved a First Amendment challenge to a local zoning ordinance that prohibited adult
movie theaters from locating close to schools, churches, and other specified places.244
The Ninth Circuit held that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because the city
was unable to show that it actually furthered, or was likely to further, a substantial
government interest.245 To justify the law, the city relied almost entirely on studies of the
secondary effects of adult movie theatres in other cities, of very different size and
character.246 The Ninth Circuit held that this was not adequate. “Renton has not studied
the effects of adult theaters and applied any such findings to the particular problems or
needs of Renton,” the court wrote. “We do not say that Renton cannot use the
experiences of other cities as part of the relevant evidence upon which to base its actions,
but in this case those experiences simply are not sufficient to sustain Renton's burden of
showing a significant governmental interest.247
The Supreme Court reversed this decision because it concluded that the city was
entitled to rely upon the evidence compiled by other cities. “The First Amendment does
not require a city,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, “before enacting such an ordinance, to
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other
cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be
relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”248 The Court held that any more rigorous
standard would limit the ability of municipalities like Renton to adequately respond to
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novel social problems.249 The result of the Court requiring (as Justice Kennedy later put
it) only “very little evidence” to uphold facially content-based zoning laws was to make it
easier for governments to pretextually justify discrimination.250 Renton, in other words,
“elevate[d] motive—which is easy for governments to fake and hard for courts to
assess—over the more objective application and justification inquiries” the Court had
previously used to deal with content-based discrimination.251
Renton was not the only Supreme Court opinion to embrace this approach. A few
years later, in Ward v Rock Against Racism, the Court once again emphasized intent over
evidence, albeit this time in a case involving a challenge to a facially content-neutral law.
The case involved a regulation that required performers at a Central Park bandshell to use
a sound amplification engineer provided by the city.252 Rock Against Racism, a group
that organized charity rock concerts in the bandshell, argued that the law was contentbased because it privileged a particular conception of sound quality (the city’s
conception) and discriminated against its very different conception of what counted as
quality sound. The Court rejected this argument because it found no evidence in the
record that the city was attempting to impose a particular aesthetic ideal on performers.
To the contrary, it found evidence that the city “require[d] its sound technician to defer to
the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix.” 253 More generally, the Court
concluded that the regulation was content-neutral because “the principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” In this case, the Court
found that the city’s principal justification for the regulation—namely, that it was
intended to “control noise levels at bandshell events”—did not evince a desire to repress
speech because the government disliked its message.
In reaching the conclusion that the sound regulation was adequately justified by a
content-neutral purpose, the Court may have been correct. There was ample evidence that
New York was not trying to repress the expression of messages or music it disliked, nor
attempting to do anything other than what it said it was trying to do.254 The Court’s
conclusion that the law was content neutral did not rest on this evidence, however.
Instead, the Court relied solely on the city’s assertions of regulatory purpose—and the
district court’s finding that the city enforced the law with deference to the wishes of
concert organizers.255
The opinion thus suggested that what the government had to show to establish the
content neutrality of a speech regulation was not clear evidence that the speech it
restricted differed in some relevant way from the speech it did not restrict, but merely the
249
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existence of some plausible, non-discriminatory purpose it intended the regulation to
further. This is certainly how lower courts subsequently interpreted the decision. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, relied heavily on Ward’s “principal inquiry” language to
justify its conclusion in Thorburn that, because the targeted picketing law was not
intended to suppress any particular messages, but applied to all targeted picketing, it was
content neutral and subject only to intermediate scrutiny.256 The Ninth Circuit also relied
upon Ward to conclude that the Gilbert sign ordinance was content-neutral because it was
not obviously motivated by animus.257
These opinions do not, in other words, demonstrate the unwillingness of lower
courts to follow Supreme Court precedents. Rather, they demonstrate how inconsistent
the Court has been in articulating the requirements of the justification test. They suggest,
as a result, that the Court did not necessarily need to embrace the highly formalist test of
content-based lawmaking that Reed announced in order to ensure that lower courts
carefully evaluated potentially discriminatory speech regulations. Instead, the Court
could merely have reaffirmed the rigorous standards that Mosley and other earlier cases
insisted courts should apply when reviewing regulations of speech.
B.

A Missed Opportunity

Imagine an alternative universe in which, rather than denying that government
purpose has any role to play in the content neutrality inquiry, the Court in Reed had
instead concluded that the Gilbert ordinance was unconstitutional because the town failed
to present any clear evidence that the distinctions it drew actually furthered its legitimate
interests in reducing traffic accidents and maintaining the municipality’s aesthetic appeal.
This is largely what Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion concluded.258
Such an approach would have been superior to the approach taken in Reed in a
number of ways. First, it would not have established a significantly overbroad rule. It
would not, in other words, have required the application of strict scrutiny even in cases
where the government has good reasons to employ the distinctions it employs.
Second, and as a consequence, it would not have created a situation in which
courts would be encouraged to apply the test narrowly, or to dilute the meaning of strict
scrutiny to uphold laws they perceived to be entirely reasonable but that Reed designated
as content-based. Justice Breyer warned in his concurring opinion that the majority rule
might lead courts to “water[] down the force of the presumption against constitutionality
that ‘strict scrutiny’ normally carries with it,” thereby “weaken[ing] the First
256
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Amendment's protection in instances where ‘strict scrutiny’ should apply in full force.”259
This is certainly a concern. But it is equally plausible that courts will simply apply the
decision as narrowly as possible to avoid reaching unpalatable conclusions.
Indeed, there is already plenty of evidence that courts are construing Reed
narrowly in order to avoid reaching undesirable results. For example, in cases involving
the regulation of strip clubs and other forms of adult entertainment, courts have continued
to apply the Renton test of content neutrality rather than the much stricter Reed test.260
This is notwithstanding the fact that, as a judge on the First Circuit acknowledged
recently, the two opinions are “logically irreconcilable.”261
These decisions demonstrate how Reed’s potentially more radical implications
may be domesticated by the lower courts. They also, however, complicate the argument
that Reed, because it is a formal test, provides more reliable protection against
discrimination than the “justified without reference” inquiry. They suggest that formalism
is not necessarily the best way to combat judicial bias, particularly in cases where the
formal rule strikes judges as unreasonable. This is particularly the case given the very
complicated doctrinal structure of much of First Amendment law. 262 The proliferating
array of categorical distinctions that populate free speech doctrine make it quite easy for
courts to distinguish Reed “up, down, and sideways.” 263 The result may be to only
intensify what is already a pronounced threat: namely, overarching doctrinal
incoherency.264 It also may inoculate from stringent constitutional scrutiny what are in
fact very troubling laws, like the zoning laws at issue in Renton.
By not requiring courts to distinguish the decision away, a revitalized justification
test might, ironically, have provided more protection to speakers targeted by certain kinds
of facially content-based laws. It also would have altered the standards that apply to the
259
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review of facially content-neutral as well as to the review of facially content-based
regulations.
One of the great disadvantages of anti-classificatory rules like the one announced
in Reed is that they make the stringency of the constitutional analysis depend almost
entirely on the presence of proscribed classifications. But the fact that a statute fails to
employ suspect classifications does not, by any means, imply that it is not a tool of
discriminatory aims. Although it may be the case, for reasons discussed in Part II, that
statutes that classify on the basis of race, or content, or other suspect classifications are
more likely than other kinds of laws to reflect a discriminatory purpose, facially neutral
laws can also provide a perfectly serviceable tool for the carrying out of unlawful
purposes. Scholars of the Equal Protection Clause have argued in fact that today it is
primarily by means of facially neutral laws that race and gender biases continue to be
given effect in American law. 265 The Court’s unwavering commitment to an anticlassificatory approach to equal protection, they argue, provides as a result extremely
poor protection against the often subtle forms of discrimination that perpetuate racial and
other kinds of inequality in contemporary society.266
The Court’s embrace of an anticlassificatory approach to the First Amendment
raises the same concern. As Timothy Zick has noted, facially neutral speech
regulations—regulations that distinguish between speakers on the basis of their location,
or the genre of their speech, or some other, non-content features of that speech—can
serve as “powerful weapon[s] of social and political control.” 267 Reed certainly
incentivizes legislators who want to discriminate to figure out a facially neutral means of
doing so. And yet the decision does nothing to address the very palpable weaknesses with
the justification test, as it presently exists.
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Of course, nothing prevents the Court from making clear, in a future decision, that
a law is not justified by a content-neutral purpose simply because the government says it
is. The analogy to the equal protection cases suggests, however, is that this is unlikely to
occur. Scholars have complained for decades now about the weakness of the test of
discrimination the Court has developed to smoke out discriminatory purpose in equal
protection cases involving facially neutral laws, but to no avail.268 This is not surprising if
one understands the Court’s turn to an anticlassificatory test of race discrimination as
motivated, at least in part, by its discomfort with vesting courts with the discretionary
authority that a more vigorous purposive inquiry would require. In its equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court has demonstrated a pronounced unwillingness to allow courts to
strike down facially neutral laws absent extremely pronounced evidence of bad intent.
There is no reason to believe its approach in First Amendment cases will be any different.
The result is that Reed is likely to produce a test of content-based lawmaking that is both
too broad and too narrow.
C.

The Drawbacks

This is not to say that a reinvigorated justification test would have no drawbacks.
By requiring courts to determine in most cases whether there is sufficiently clear
evidence to justify the differential treatment of speech, it would vest courts with
considerably more discretion than they possess under Reed.
This discretion could be cabined somewhat by embedding within the test a much
narrower anticlassificatory rule. In her concurring opinion, Justice Kagan argued that,
although courts should only apply strict scrutiny to laws that make subject matter and
other kinds of content distinctions when they raise the “realistic possibility that [the]
official suppression of ideas is afoot,” they should always apply strict scrutiny to laws
that make viewpoint distinctions because laws of this sort always raise doubts about the
government’s motivations.269
This approach to the content discrimination inquiry would certainly not create the
problems that the extension of strict scrutiny to subject matter-based and other kinds of
content-based laws would, given how infrequently the government employs viewpoint
distinctions when it regulates the public sphere, and how difficult it is to think of
legitimate reasons why the government might wish to do so. It would also limit the range
of cases in which courts would be required to evaluate the evidentiary basis of the
government’s justifications in order to determine the standard of scrutiny that applies.
What a test that applied strict scrutiny to all laws that make viewpoint distinctions
would require courts to do, however, is to identify when laws make a viewpoint as
opposed to some other kind of content distinction. Given how blurry the line between
subject matter and viewpoint distinctions frequently turns out to be, it is not all clear how
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much in practice Justice Kagan’s narrower anti-classificatory rule would actually
constrain the discretion vested courts under the justification test.270
A revitalized justification test would constrain judicial discretion in another way,
however: namely, by reminding courts of the fundamental constitutional values that
motivate the doctrinal rules. Over seventy years ago, in Schneider v. State, Justice
Roberts asserted what remains today a fundamental principle of First Amendment law:
namely, that although “[m]ere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may . . . support regulation directed at other personal activities, [they
are] insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions” as the rights protected by the First
Amendment.271 Hence, Justice Roberts concluded, “the delicate and difficult task falls
upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the[se] rights.”272
A test of content-based lawmaking that required courts, in almost all cases, to evaluate
the empirical evidence provided to justify restricting speech in order to determine the
level of scrutiny that applies would operate as a continuing reminder of this central First
Amendment norm.
This may be, ultimately, the best way to guard against the repressive impulses of
judges, given the inherent power of courts to make even bright-line tests fuzzy. Vincent
Blasi has argued that “[i]t would be a mistake to assume that the strategy for protecting
the central norms of the first amendment must emphasize the tactic of doctrinal
compulsion——the fashioning of specific, highly protective tests that would bind lower
courts and officials in times of stress.”273 This is because, Blasi argued, it is difficult to
fashion any legal rule “with sufficient prescience and precision to achieve that type of
behavioral effect to any great degree.”274 The complicated ways in which lower courts
are already trying to limit the effects of the Reed decision provide a good illustration of
Blasi’s point.
In articulating what Justice Thomas described in his opinion in Reed as a “clear
and firm” test of content-based lawmaking, the Court may have thus been attempting to
guarantee a kind of predictability that no formal test can provide.275 Meanwhile, it created
a test that overly constrains the government’s regulatory autonomy in some respects and
provides, in other respects, insufficient protection to those targeted by facially neutral
laws. Given these serious problems with the Reed test, it is hard to see why a revitalized
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justificiation test would have provided a worse solution to the problem of content
discrimination than that which the Reed test provides—and in many respects it would
have been far superior.
Of course, the Reed majority did not embrace Justice Kagan’s alternative solution.
Reed remains, for now at least, the law. The sheer breath of the Reed test makes it likely,
however that Justice Kagan was correct when she predicted that its application would not
be easy or without contestation: that litigants would continue to seek ways to narrow the
test and that these efforts would continue to generate difficult questions about the scope
and the meaning of the presumption against content-based lawmaking.276 Despite its
efforts to do so, the Reed majority may not, in other words, have resolved the decadeslong fight over the meaning of the First Amendment anti-discrimination principle. Going
forward, it therefore behooves both scholars and courts to remember the costs, as well as
the benefits, of an anti-classificatory approach.
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